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TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Abstract

The use, or threat of use, of trade policy instruments to ensure that human rights are respected
by governments of partner countries is not new. Its latest and controversial manifestation is the
proposal for the inclusion of a so-called social clause in the mandate of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that would condition access of a member to markets of other members on that member's
ensuring that certain 'core' labour standards prevail in its economy. The proposal is ostensibly based
on a sweeping claim of universality and eternity for a particular set of 'core' labour standards, viz.
freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, freedom from forced labour, and
a minimum age for employment of children.
The paper analyzes the moral, philosophical and economic arguments for and against linking
trade and human rights. It finds that while claims of universals of labour standards are overblown,
addressing the legitimate concerns that citizens of one country may have about what they deem 'poor'
conditions of work or 'exploitation' of children by parents or employers in other countries are better
does not require the use of trade sanctions. The fact that the proposal for a social clause is being
pushed by major developed countries when labour-intensive imports from developing countries are
penetrating their markets suggests that protectionist interests have captured the drive for labour
standards. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role of multilateral institutions in improving
labour standards.

Keywords: Human Rights, Labour Standards, International Trade, Developing Countries, Prison
Labour, World Trade Organization (WTO), International Labour Organization (ILO)
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TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
T. N. Srinivasan*

1.

Introduction
The use, or threat of use, of trade policy instruments to ensure that human rights are respected

by governments of partner countries is not new. The most notable instance, of course, of multilateral
trade sanctions to punish and eliminate the violation of human rights was against the South African
government's apartheid policies. Clearly the collapse of the apartheid regime has been attributed by
many to the opprobrium, if not the economic cost to South Africa, of the sanction.
Again, human rights advocates in the United States have lobbied, without success so far,
against the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China. Ever since President Clinton
issued an executive order in 1993 requiring that the Secretary of State shall not recommend renewal of
MFN status unless certain human rights conditions are met, an annual battle between human rights
groups and those, prominently business groups with significant stakes in trade with and investment in
China, has raged over the renewal. The inefficacy of the ambiguous signals that a divided US political
scene sends to China is seen from the fact that, despite immense pressures not to do so, China recently
charged and sentenced Wang Dan, a prominent student leader of the pro-democracy demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, with the capital crime of conspiracy to overthrow the
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government, after holding him in prison for over six years. In his report on this event, Patrick Tyler of
the New York Times writes
"For the Clinton Administration, the prospect that the youthful Mr. Wang could
receive a new and lengthy prison term presents a difficult foreign policy challenge.
Earlier this year, Mr. Clinton privately signaled Beijing that if re-elected, he would like
to bring a permanent end to the campaign of sanctions and trade pressure that
Washington has used to win improvements in human rights conditions here.
To go forward with this plan, Mr. Clinton urged Beijing to show compassion to
those who had been harassed or locked up for expressing political views.
Now, in the midst of a Presidential campaign in which his foreign policy is under
assault, Mr. Clinton will be under greater pressure to explain how his position toward
Beijing has garnered any results and how the United States can influence the
deteriorating conditions under which many intellectuals and political dissidents live in
China.
Most of the political prisoners on whose behalf Mr. Clinton has interceded with
Chinese leaders are now back in prison or in permanent exile." (New York Times,
October 13, 1996, p. 1)
But South Africa and China have not been the only cases that have drawn the attention of
human rights groups. There is significant support in the U.S. for trade sanctions against Myanmar to
punish human rights violations of the military dictatorship there. Interestingly, while the U.S.
administration has suggested that by 'constructively engaging' China economically through the grant of
MFN status the cause of human rights there would be better served, it has opposed the same argument
advanced by ASEAN countries against trade sanctions against Myanmar! The facts that political and
trade relations with China are far more consequential to US foreign policy and business interests than
those with Myanmar certainly played a role in differing US stance in the two cases.1

1

Of course, it should be no surprise that domestic politics, foreign policy, and trade policy
interact. As early as a quarter century ago, Richard Cooper (1972) recognized the linkage, at least of
the last two, by entitling his article “Trade Policy is Foreign Policy” and publishing it in Foreign Policy!
The most recent instance is the intense pressure put on Mexico to agree not to sell their tomatoes in
the U.S. (with which it has a Free Trade Agreement) at a price lower than 20.68 cents a pound. David
Sanger [New York Times, October 12, 1996] quotes a senior official of the Clinton Administration:
“This was Mexico’s moment to pay back for the bailout” (p.1) presumably referring to the U.S.
decision to lend Mexico $12.5 billion following the peso crisis of December 1994. He quotes another
official as saying “The math was pretty simple, Florida has 25 electoral votes, and Mexico doesn’t”
(p.9).
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The latest, and internationally controversial, issue relating to trade and human rights is that of
labour standards.2 It has surfaced in international fora including the World Trade Organization
(WTO). I will focus exclusively on this issue in the rest of this paper since an analysis of it illustrates
almost all of the difficult economic, moral, philosophical and political problems associated with using
trade policy as an instrument for enforcing human rights. Indeed, the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) to the President of the United States view 'core' labour standards as representing "fundamental
human and democratic rights in the work place, rights that should prevail in all societies whatever their
level of development" (CEA (1995), p. 250, emphasis added).
Thus a sweeping claim of universality and eternity is made for a particular set of "core" labour
standards viz. "freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, freedom from
forced labour, and a minimum age for the employment of children" (ibid, p. 250). Acceptance of such
a claim will of course imply, for example, that any diversity in the content and scope of core standards
among countries according to stage of development would be illegitimate. As such, one has to examine
the validity of the claim and I do so in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to moral and philosophical
arguments, such as the humanitarian concern that citizens of one country may have about what they
deem "poor" conditions of work or "exploitation" of children by parents or employers. It will be argued
that although such concerns are legitimate, their alleviation requires solutions that do not include the
use of trade sanctions. Section 4 analyzes the economic arguments, pro and con, for the use of trade
policy instruments and briefly reviews the empirical evidence on the effects of diverse labour standards
on export performance and inflow of foreign direct investment. Section 5 discusses the role of
multilateral institutions in improving labour standards and concludes the paper.

2

Lal (1981, Chapter 3) offers a trenchant critique of human rights arguments in favour of
minimum labour standards.
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2.

Universality and Eternity of Human Rights and of Core Labour Standards
According to a recent report from the Organisation for Cooperation and Economic

Development (OECD), starting from several international treaties early in this century on the
elimination of slavery, a body of international law on human rights, including certain basic workers'
rights, has evolved. This body of law
"considers human rights as universal, transcending all political, economic, social and
cultural situations. They are characterised as such because they involve the
fundamental liberty, dignity and respect of the individual. Moreover, freedom of
association, prohibition of forced labour, elimination of child labour exploitation and
the principle of non-discrimination are well established elements of the human rights
international jurisprudence; in fact these workers' rights are an inseparable part of
human rights" (OECD (1996), p. 7).
The World Social Summit of the United Nations held in Copenhagen "reinforced international
consensus on fundamental human and workers' rights. In Commitment 3 of the Declaration from this
summit, nations affirm their adhesion to certain workers' rights, which are identical to the core labour
standards selected in this study" (ibid).
The International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919 as part of the implementation
of the Treaty of Versailles3,
"...over the past 75 years ... has adopted a series of conventions which set international
labor standards. Through ratification, these conventions create binding obligations for
member states. The conventions cover a wide range of issues in the world of work,
including basic human rights such as freedom of association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, freedom from forced labor, freedom from discrimination in
employment, and severe restrictions on the use of child labor" (Maier (1994), p. 12).
Nine ILO conventions are particularly relevant from the perspective of labour standards.
These relate to freedom of association such as the right to organize (No. 87), and collective bargaining
(No. 98), forced labour (no. 29) and its abolition (No. 105), non-discrimination in employment and
occupation (No. 111) and in remuneration (No. 100), employment policy (No. 122), minimum age of

3

Some of the conventions adopted by the ILO over the years reflect the tenor of the times: a
faith in the need for the state to play a very active role in the economy and its ability to fulfill the
assigned role efficiently and effectively. Such a faith would seem misplaced in the light of experience.
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employment (No. 138) and tripartite (i.e. workers, employers and government) consultation (No.
144).
Although the CEA, as noted in the introduction, views several of the subjects of these
conventions as representing "fundamental human and democratic rights in the work place," ironically
the US has ratified only two of the nine conventions just cited: those on abolition of forced labour and
on tripartite consultation (World Bank (1995), Table A4). Indeed, the record of US ratification of
ILO conventions is even more disappointing. Charnovitz (1995, p. 178) reports that
"The United States has become a party to only 12 ILO conventions, including 5 in
recent years. This is the worst record of any major industrial nation...This
disinclination to ratify ILO conventions stems mainly from two concerns. First,
because U.S. treaties are the "supreme law of the land," ratifying an ILO convention
could supersede federal and state labor laws if provisions of the convention can be
enforced in domestic courts. Second, many Americans are reluctant to have U.S.
policy reviewed by an international organization. As a consequence, the United States
has not ratified the core ILO conventions on freedom of association and the right to
organize, nor has it ratified any of the child labor conventions."
Interestingly, OECD countries other than the U.S. have ratified most of the nine conventions.
At the same time, the conventions on freedom of association and forced labour and non-discrimination
have been ratified by all but a handful of countries who are members of ILO. Although President
Carter signed a convention on Women's Rights in 1980, the U.S. Senate is yet to ratify it (New York
Times, December 11, 1996, p. A7).4 Compliance, however, is another matter, though (and this is
important) it is subject to periodic monitoring and review once a convention is ratified.
Ever since its creation, the United Nations (UN) has been concerned with human rights.
Article 55 of the UN charter requires that countries should, inter alia, promote respect for human
rights and basic liberties for all, without distinction of race, gender language or religion, not only as an
end in itself, but also as a necessary condition for maintenance of peaceful relations between countries.

4

Negotiating and signing a treaty or convention by a representative of the U.S. executive are
the initial steps, and its ratification by the U.S. Senate is the final step, in its becoming legally binding
on the U.S. government.
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 adopted by the UN General Assembly without
dissent gives an even more detailed description of human rights. These include
"civil and political rights (the right to life, liberty, freedom from torture, freedom of
opinion and expression, freedom from slavery and servitude, right to peaceful assembly
and association) and economic, social and cultural rights (right to join and form trade
unions, right to work, right to equal pay for equal work, right to education). Again, the
right to decent living standards is regarded as one important element" (OECD (1996),
p. 7).
The Declaration did not require ratification. It took nearly 20 years to transform the
principles of the Declaration into treaty provisions establishing legal obligations on the part of each
ratifying state. At the end of 1966, two covenants, one dealing with civil and political rights, the other
with economic, social and cultural rights, and an optional protocol were adopted by the General
Assembly. Another 10 years elapsed before the required minimum number of states ratified the two
covenants and the optional protocol. As of this year, a total of 132 states (including the U.S.) have
ratified the covenant on civil and political rights, 133 the covenant on economic, social and cultural
rights and 87 the optional protocol. The U.S. has signed, but not ratified, the covenant on economic,
social and cultural rights and is not a signatory of the optional protocol.5 An even larger number of
states (168) has ratified the UN convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989. Clearly the
obligations of the Charter are binding on members of the U.N.
Besides international agreements, conventions and covenants, the constitutions of some
countries require their government to promote human rights. For example, the Constitution of India
has a chapter entitled Directive Principles of State Policy which enjoins the state to strive to secure "a
social order in which justice--social, economic and political--shall inform all the institutions of national
life" and "to minimize inequality in income, status, facilities and opportunities, amongst individuals
and groups." Further, the state is required to ensure "that the ownership and control of the material
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I thank Bruce Russet for enlightening me on the history of human rights in the United

Nations.
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resources of the community are so distributed as best to subscribe to the common good; that the
operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of
production to the common detriment" (Basu (1983). The constitution also protects the rights to work,
to education, and to public assistance in case of unemployment, disability, or sickness.
This review leads to two conclusions: First, except for a notable few, almost all states have
signed and ratified a set of covenants that recognize an immense and overwhelming array of civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights that go beyond the so-called 'core' labour standards. All
of these are universal rights, not just the few selected for trade sanctions by the proponents of the
Social Clause, whether at the OECD or by the CEA in Washington. That selectivity must be explained
and has to do, in all likelihood, with competitive pressures rather than human rights (Bhagwati
(1995)). Second, almost none of the many rights are satisfied in reality including in OECD countries:
for example, discrimination on the basis of race and sex still exist even in the U.S. This suggests that,
at best, the rights recognized are universal aspirations, perhaps to be attained at some unspecified and
distant future, though cynics might view them as empty rhetoric. Be that as it may, it is worth
reiterating that the claim of universality and eternity, for a subset of rights covering the so-called 'core'
labour standards, is overblown.
In conclusion, let me cite one final comment by Heribert Maier, the Deputy Director General
of the ILO, on the question of "core" labour standards: "the ILO has not yet reached a political
consensus of its ILO constituents to identify clearly a core group of convention or minimum standards"
(Maier (1994), p. 13).

3.

Concern in High Income Countries About Labor Standards in Developing Countries
A concern about poor labour standards in general, and child labour in particular, has been

expressed by various groups in high income countries. Groups in the U.S. such as "Save the Children"
have raised funds to help poor children in less developed countries. It would indeed be wrong to
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dismiss such concerns out of hand since they could arise from altruism, e.g. the welfare of workers and
children in poor countries could be an argument in the utility functions of at least some individuals
and groups in rich countries, so that their utility increases if the welfare of workers and children in
poor countries increases. On the other hand, such concerns could also arise from purely selfish
motives: the fear of erosion of one's high standards through a "race-to-the-bottom" in the global
economy, where "low" labour standards anywhere threaten the sustainability of "high" labour standards
everywhere. Thus low labour standards in one country are perceived as negative externalities imposed
on high standard countries by low standard countries.
Altruistic citizens of rich countries have, in principle, many ways of more efficiently and
effectively expressing their concerns than through lobbying for imposing trade sanctions on countries
with poor labour standards in the expectation that such sanctions would be effective in inducing the
governments of such countries to institute policies for raising labour standards. First of all, it is not
inconceivable that a country threatened with trade sanctions for failure to raise its labour standards
might not respond by raising them but instead choose to forego gains from trade. Second, instead of
relying on the indirect means through linkage which depends on the desired response by the
developing country for its success, the citizens of the developed countries could adopt a more effective
direct means of pressuring their own governments to lift any restrictions on immigration of workers
from countries with poor labour standards. If they choose to migrate, such workers would enjoy higher
labour standards prevailing in the country of immigration. Indeed there is support for lifting such
restrictions on moral-philosophical grounds as in the writings of John Rawls (1993a). He views
freedom of movement and freedom of choice of occupation as essential primary goods equivalent to
other basic rights and liberties, the entitlement to which is not open to political debate and allocation
through the political process. While Rawls was writing about these freedoms in the context of
constitutional essentials of a just society, implicit in the very expression of humanitarian concerns
about others must be a view of the whole human race as one society. As such, a natural extension of

9
Rawls' ideas would treat freedom of movement of humans across artificial political boundaries as a
basic human right.6
Even if lifting immigration restrictions is deemed infeasible politically, still citizens of rich
countries could make income transfers to the workers in poor countries. With higher incomes, it is
reasonable to presume that the supply price (broadly defined to include labour standard) of their
labour would rise and to restore labour market equilibrium, labour standards would have to rise.
Indeed a test of the depth of their humanitarian concern is the price that citizens are willing to pay for
translating the concern into an actual increase in welfare of workers in poor countries. Willingness to
make needed income transfers is a demonstration of the willingness to pay the price.
Turning now to child labour, excepting the abusive ones, most parents will weigh welfare of
their children significantly in making choices for them. And in making those choices, given their
resources and opportunities, such parents could reasonably be expected to take into account the cost of
putting their children to work in terms of their health and education relative to the income they bring
in. As such, if some parents choose to put their children to work, it reflects more than anything else
the limitations of their resources and opportunities, viz. their poverty. Once again, citizens of
developed countries concerned with the welfare of such working children among the poor in developing
countries could influence the choices of parents away from putting their children to work altogether or
at least reduce the amount of work done by their children through income transfers to parents. Such
transfers relax their resource constraints.
The fear of a "race-to-the-bottom" arises from the expectation that faced with competition from
low cost (because of their low labour standards) developing countries, producers in countries with high

6

By accepting existing political boundaries, Rawls himself does not make such an extension in
his essay on "Law of Peoples" (Rawls 1993b) and is criticised for this failure by Ackerman (1994). In
his earlier work, Ackerman (Ackerman (1971, pp. 89-95, 256-57)) argued that while there may be
some grounds for restriction on immigration in real-world states, not only such restrictions should be
exercised with great care, given the ease with which they may be abused, but also, such restrictions
must be accompanied by a massive increase in foreign aid.
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labour standards would lobby for lowering labour standards are home by threatening to move
production to labour standard countries. Those who harbour such fears have the option of not buying
such imported products so that domestic producers will no longer face import competition.
By not buying products of a firm or a country that does not observe what consumers view as
acceptable labour standards they can send a clear and effective signal to that firm or country to force it
to choose between observing standards and retain the market or lose the market altogether.7 If it
chooses to retain the market by observing acceptable labour standards, to the extent the cost of the
import goes up because of such observance, both the exporting country and the buyers of imports share
the cost of improving labour standards. If it chooses to forego the market, then while workers in the
exporting industry do not gain welfare through higher standards, there is a penalty to the firm in the
form of lost exports. If the citizens of the developed countries are interested only in raising the welfare
of the workers and not in penalizing the exporting firm, they will have to compensate the firm or make
income transfer to workers. The basic point is that there is a real cost to raising labour standards and
that has to be incurred if the intended raise is to come about.
It should also be pointed out that the standard characterization of a "race-to-the-bottom" as a
classic Prisoner's Dilemma game can be questioned. For example, consider a game of strategy between
two countries with respect to their choice of labour standards. It has a conventional pay-off matrix

7

It might appear that consumers must have the information needed to distinguish the nonobserving firms from observing ones to engage in such behaviour. However market forces might
themselves generate such information as long as the consumers refuse to buy that product (or all
products from a country) if they suspect some firms (or some products from that country) are being
produced under unacceptable conditions. In such a case, producers (or countries) who maintain
acceptable standards will have an incentive to invest in signalling (in a credible way) to the consumers
that they in fact do so and thus distinguish themselves from those that do not.
Michiel Keyzer, in a private conversation, raised a troubling aspect of consumer boycott. Of
course boycott of products produced under working conditions that consumers deem unacceptable
would seem appropriate. But how should one view boycott of products because they have been
produced by particular groups in other countries that consumers in one country deem unacceptable for
reasons of racial, ethnic or other prejudices?
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reflecting the real incomes yielded (in brackets) when different labour standards are set at levels "low"
and "high" by the two countries, Home and Foreign.
There are thus four possible combinations of home and foreign labour standards. The pay-offs
associated with each combination (with the first (resp. second) component being the pay-off of the
Home (resp. foreign) countries are given by the following pay-off matrix:
Foreign Strategy
Low

High

Home

Low

(-2,-2)

(2,-3)

Strategy

High

(-3, 2)

(1, 1)

It is easily seen that each country has a dominant strategy, viz. to set a low standard, because by doing
so it maximises its pay-off whether the other country chooses to set a high or low standard. Yet,
compared to this individually-rational dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium with both countries setting
low standards, the collectively rational strategy of each setting a high standard will yield a higher payoff for both.8
Of course competition need not necessarily lead to such a "prisoner's dilemma" type of Nash
equilibrium. For example, if the pay-off matrix is as follows,
Foreign Strategy
Low

High

Home

Low

(-4, -4)

(2, -3)

Strategy

High

(-3, 2)

(1, 1)

8

Aficionados of common-knowledge repeated game theory will point out that the collectively
rational outcome could be sustained as an equilibrium through a suitable punishment strategy for
deviation as long as both participants do not discount the future too heavily. Despite the fascination
of political scientists for repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games, their relevance for real-life politics is
dubious.
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then (Low,High) and (High,Low) are both (pure strategy) Nash equilibria. In each of these one
jurisdiction sets a low standard while the other sets a high standard.
In both cases above, the Nash equilibrium is characterised by a "race to the bottom" in the
sense that at least one country sets a low standard. But this need not be so, as consideration of the
following pay-off matrix shows. Thus, consider:
Foreign Strategy
Low

High

Home

Low

(-2, -2)

(2, -3)

Strategy

High

(-3, 2)

(3, 3)

It is readily seen that we have a unique Nash equilibrium where each country sets a high standard.
Of course, these are arbitrarily-constructed pay-off matrices and we need to ground them in
underlying models of economies to see whether such outcomes are sensible within them. However,
they are adequate to demonstrate that a destructive "race-to-the bottom" is not inevitable in the
competition to set labour standards.
To sum up, the fact that citizens in rich countries could be, and often are, genuinely concerned
about poor working conditions, and the use of child labour in poor countries does not necessarily imply
that such concerns can be addressed only through the use of trade policy instrument.

4.

Economics of Labour Standards
There is an extensive and growing literature on the economics (theoretical and empirical) of

labour standards. Stern (1996) has critically surveyed this literature. Another useful survey is by
Anderson (1996). Instead of going over the ground covered by them, I will confine myself here, first,
to reproducing the argument that I have made elsewhere (Srinivasan (1996)) that diversity in labour
standards among countries is not only legitimate but also does not detract from the case for free trade.
In other words, such diversity, like diversity in tastes, technology or factor endowments, is a source for
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gainful trade based on comparative advantage. Second, I will offer a critique of two recent
contributions (Rodrik (1996) and Krueger (1996)). Krueger's contribution is particularly relevant
from the perspective of political economy.

4.1. Legitimate Diversity of Labour Standards
In modeling diversity of labour standards, I follow Brown et al. (1996) in postulating that
standards divert resources from production and they also affect welfare, as an argument of consumers'
utility function in addition to the amounts consumed of various goods.
Consider first a small-open economy producing and consuming two goods. Let Qi and Ci
denote respectively the production and consumption of good i (i=1,2). Let S denote the level of
economy-wide labour standards. Let U[C1, C2, S] be the strictly concave Samuelson social utility
function with Uj > 0, where Uj denotes the partial derivative U with respect to its jth argument. Let Q1
= F(Q2, S; K̄ , L̄ ) denote the production possibility frontier denoting the efficient combination of Q1,
Q2 that could be produced, given the level S of labour standard and inelastically supplied endowments
of K̄ , L̄ of capital and labour respectively. F is concave in Q2 and S with F > 0, F1 < 0, F2 < 0, F3 >
0, F4 > 0, where Fj is the partial derivative of F with respect to its jth argument. In effect, the labour
standard is treated as if it is a good produced and consumed within the country, i.e. a non-traded good.
With good 1 as the numeraire let the world price of good 2 be . Under balanced trade, the economy's
choice of C1, C2, Q1, Q2 and S is determined by maximizing
U[C1, C2, S]

(1)

C1 + C2 = Q1 + Q2

(2)

Q1 = F[Q2, S; K̄ , L̄ ]

(3)

Ci > 0, Q2 > 0; S > 0

(4)

subject to
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Substituting (2) and (3) in (1) the problem reduces to maximizing U[F + (Q2 - C2), C2, S] with
respect to Q2, C2 and S. Assuming an interior maximum, the first-order conditions yield
U2/U1 =

(5)

F1 = -

(6)

U3/U1 = -F2

(7)

The interpretation of (5)-(7) is straightforward. Equation (5) states that the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption of good 2 for 1 viz. U2/U1 equals its world price . Equation (6) states
that the marginal rate of transformation of good 2 into good 1 viz. -F1 equals its world price . Thus
(5) and (6) together imply that both consumers and producers should face world prices were the
optimum to be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. Thus free trade is the optimal policy.
Equation (7) states that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of labour standard for good 1 in
consumption viz. U3/U1 should equal the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of labour standard
and good 1 in production, that is, the cost of labour standard in terms of foregone output of good 1 in
production viz. -F2.
Since the exogenous variables of the problem are the terms-of-trade

and the factor

endowments K̄ , L̄ the optimal values of the endogenous variables Qi, Ci and S will be functions of
them. In a world of small open economies, in a free trade equilibrium, while

is the same for all

countries, even if tastes and technology (i.e. the utility and production functions) respectively are the
same, the endowment K̄ , L̄ will in general differ. As such the optimal values of endogenous variables,
particularly the level of labour standards would differ across countries. Under plausible assumptions
on U and F it can be shown that a richer country, i.e. one with a greater endowment of one or both
factors, will choose a higher standard. Clearly there is nothing illegitimate or unfair about such
diversity.

15
In the above discussion the determination of

through global market clearance was left

implicit. To make it explicit and to explore other aspects of labour standards, it is useful to set up the
problem as one of choosing Pareto Optimal (across countries) levels of output, consumption and labour
standards.
j

j

Let ( C i , Qi , S j ) denote respectively the consumption of good i, production of good i (i=1,2),
and labour standard in country j (j = 1,...N). Under appropriate assumptions on utility functions and
production functions, any Pareto Optimum can be characterized as the solution to the maximization of
a positively weighted sum of individual country utilities,
N

j

j

U j(C i , S j)

j 1

(8)

subject to

j

j

Q1

Ci

j

Ci

j

j

Qi

j

j

j

0, S j

0

i 1,2
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F j(Q2 , S j; K̄ , L̄ )

0, Qi

j

(9)

j 1,2,...N

(10)

i 1,2; j 1,2,...N

(11)

Equation (9) represents global market clearance for good i and it replaces the balance of trade
equation (2) of the small-country problem.
Assuming that the non-negativity constraints (11) do not bind, the first-order conditions for
j

j

the optimal choice of C i , Qi and Sj are:
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In (12)-(15),
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j 1,...N
Fj

(14)

j 1,...N

j

Q2

(15)

is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with constraint (9), which ensures that there is

no excess supply or demand for good i in the world. µj is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the
production transformation constraint (10) for country j. Taking (12) and (15) together, one gets:
Uj
j

C2

/

Uj
j

C1

2

Fj

1

Q2

Thus the MRS is consumption of good 2 for good 1, viz. (

with the common value being

(16)
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/
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) is the same in all countries j,

/ 1. Also the MRT of good 2 for good 1 in production, i.e. -

2

same in all countries j and its common value is also

Fj
j

Q2

is the

/ 1. This in turn means that if the chosen Pareto

2

Optimum (i.e. the one corresponding to a particular set of

j

) is implemented as a competitive
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equilibrium, then consumers and producers in all countries will have to face the same relative price of
good 2 in terms of good 1. In other words, a Pareto Optimum implemented as a competitive
equilibrium will be characterized by free trade.
It is seen from (12)-(14) that the MRS of labour standard for good 1 in country j, viz.
Uj
Sj

Uj

/

j

C1

equals the MRT of labour standards for good 1 in production in country j, viz.

Fj
Sj

.

However this common value of MRS and MRT can differ across countries. Once again such diversity
is legitimate.
In the above analysis there was no requirement that each country's trade be balanced, only that
globally there was no excess supply or demand for each commodity. Thus, given an arbitrary choice of
j

if the corresponding Pareto Optimum were to be implemented as a Pareto Optimum, the world

market clearing relative price of good 2 in terms of good 1 will obviously be

/ 1. However, there is

2

nothing to ensure that at these prices the value of the optimal consumption bundle of country j, i.e.
j

C1

2

j

j

C2 equals the value of its optimal production bundle, i.e. Q1

1

2

j

Q2 (i = 1,2). However,

1

global clearance of the world market for each of the two goods ensures that for the world as a whole
the value of its consumption equals value of production. In other words, while trade need not be
balanced for any country, for the world as a whole it is balanced. Thus to implement any arbitrary
Pareto Optimum transfers to each country (equaling the excess of the value of its consumption bundle
over the value of its production bundle) will in general be required. Of course some countries will
receive and others make positive transfers. Because world trade is balanced, such transfers added over
all the countries is zero. Thus making such transfers is feasible. However, following Negishi (1960) it
can be shown that a set of positive

j

will in general exist such that the associated Pareto Optimum

18
could be implemented without intercountry transfers. That is to say, a Pareto Optimum can be shown
to exist which can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium at which the trade of each country is
balanced. Let such a Pareto Optimum be denoted as No-Transfer Pareto Optimum or NTPO. For
simplicity let us assume that NTPO is unique.
Clearly the analysis does not suggest that at such an NTPO the associated labour standard Sj is
the same in all countries. Such diversity is legitimate: after all the situation being characterized is a
Pareto Optimum and it does not call for intercountry transfers. What if the vector (S1, ... SN) is
deemed unsatisfactory in the sense that the standards in some country or countries are below some
minimum acceptable level S̄ ?
Suppose for concreteness, let Sj < S̄ for j = 1,2,...M (M < N). Leaving aside the questions as
to how the minimum S̄ is set and if there is a consensus on S̄ , how such a consensus came about, one
could proceed as follows.9 Suppose among the set of Pareto Optima (i.e. the set obtained as

j

are

varied) there is a non-empty subset the elements of which satisfy Sj > S̄ for all j. Then by definition
any element of this subset will obviously meet the minimum standard criterion. However two points
are noteworthy. First, by assumption NTPO is not an element of the subset. As such intercountry
transfers would be necessary were any member of the subset is to be implemented as a competitive
equilibrium. Second, if there is more than one element in the subset, different elements will differ with
respect to the distribution of welfare as well as transfers among countries. However, there is no way to
choose among elements of this subset since the only requirement was that the minimal standard S̄ be
met. In a sense this is nice since additional criteria about the distribution of welfare and transfer could

9

Indeed with each country's labour standards entering only its production and utility functions,
i.e. with no international spillover effects on other country's production or utility functions, it is hard
to rationalize a common minimum standard S̄ . The case of spillover effects is considered below.
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be brought to bear in making a choice. Be that as it may, the important point is that as long as there
exists a non-empty set of Pareto Optima meeting the minimal standards, it is feasible to meet such
standards with income transfers but without departing from free trade. As such there is no need for a
social clause or to put it another way the only rationale for a social clause has to be the odious one of
protection of import competing industries.
What if there is no Pareto Optimum satisfying Sj > S̄ for all j? Suppose that the minimum S̄
is the result of an international consensus as is the case with ILO conventions. Then it is natural to
look for Restricted Pareto Optima, i.e. Pareto Optima subject to the additional restriction
-Sj < - S̄

(17)

It can be seen that once (17) is added to (9)-(11), the only first-order condition that is altered
is (13) which replaced by
j

Uj
S

where
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Fj
S

j
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(18)

is the Langrangean multiplier associated with constraint (17). Taking (12), (14) and (18)

together it follows that
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Thus from (19) it is seen that now there is a wedge between MRS in consumption of good 1 labour
standard, viz.
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. Now

1

> 0 and

1

> 0 (the reason being reducing S̄ cannot reduce global welfare). As such (19) implies that the
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shadow consumer relative price of labour standard in terms of good 1, namely the MRS is lower than
its shadow producer price, namely the MRT. Thus, in effect a consumer subsidy inducing demand for
higher labour standards relative to goods or equivalently a producer tax that induces a lower supply of
goods relative to standards is needed to sustain the optimum. However, since the other first order
conditions are unchanged, it is the case that restricted Pareto Optima are characterized by free trade.
Thus international income transfers (depending on

j

) and a domestic tax or subsidy to induce the

appropriate level of standards are needed to sustain a Pareto Optimum. Indeed one could view the
international assistance and domestic compliance measures associated with implementing ILO
conventions as precisely the right approach.
The analysis thus far shows that diversity in labour standards or the implementation of a
common minimal standards do not call for deviation from free trade as long as Pareto Optimality is the
objective and there is willingness not only to make income transfers between countries as necessary
but, to the extent standards in one country directly affects the welfare of another, such externalities are
internalized in each country. What if this situation of "first best" does not obtain? In answering this
question it is useful to distinguish between departures from first best in a closed economy from those
in an open economy. Obviously the possible use of trade policy to improve labour standards arise only
in an open economy.
In a closed economy, labour standards could be sub-optimally low because of possible market
failures. For example, if improving the safety of the work environment involves some initial
investment that will pay off in terms of improved future worker productivity, if capital markets are not
efficient, the employer may not be able to obtain the resources for such investment. Suffices it to say
that departures from first best arising from domestic market failures do not raise new issues in the
context of labour standards. And policies that address the failure at its source (the capital market in
the above example) are the appropriate interventions. Even if there are no market failures, so that the
prevailing labour standards are consistent with a domestic Pareto optimum, still the real income
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distribution associated with the laissez-faire Pareto Optimum may be deemed unsatisfactory. In
particular, the labour standards (along with factor and commodity prices) are also a reflection of the
real income distribution. Changing the income distribution through policy will also change the
equilibrium labour standards. Once again there is nothing peculiar to labour standards in this and, as
seen in the international context earlier, non-distortionary lump-sum income (or wealth) redistribution
policy is the first best to move the income distribution (and consequently the equilibrium labour
standards in the right direction). If the first-best policy is infeasible, then other policies (such as, for
example, commodity or factor taxes or subsidies) could in principle be used to achieve a better income
distribution and labour standards albeit at the cost of a dead weight loss. In general, which taxes and
what levels are to be used in achieving the desired change in labour standards while minimizing the
dead-weight loss will vary across economies.
One of the core labour standards promoted by the ILO is the freedom of workers to form
labour unions and presumably engage in collective bargaining. Such rights are rarely absolute: some
workers (e.g. in public administration) are denied these rights by law in many countries. Whether
such freedoms should be deemed a fundamental human right on par with other primary goods in the
Rawlsian sense is arguable. In any case, for an overwhelming majority of poor workers in developing
countries whose dominant mode of employment is self-employment in rural agricultural activities or in
the urban informal sector, unionization has little relevance. Even where relevant and where the
freedom to form unions has been exercised to a significant extent, namely in the organized
manufacturing and public sectors in poor countries, labour unions have been seen promoting the
interests of a small section of the labour force at the expense of many.
Of course, whether or not unions promote general welfare there is no rationale for their
suppression. But it should be recognized, first, that unionized labour often constitute a small labour
aristocracy in poor countries. Besides, even in rich countries, members of some unions have little voice
in decision making within the union, not to mention the association of organized crime with the
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leadership of a few. Second, and more important, promoting labour standards that cannot be
sustained in equilibrium at the particular stage of development of a country could be very expensive in
terms of foregone growth. Depending on whether such standards vary across industries and the time
phasing of their introduction, wage and profit rates, as well as employment in different industries as
well as in the aggregate would be affected differently. As the analysis of Brown et al. (1996) shows, the
effects will depend on the technology and the characteristics of labour standards and no general answer
can be given.
Turning now to open economies, it is clear that in the absence of a first-best non-trade related
policy, trade policies could be used to change equilibrium labour standards. This can be seen simply in
the case of trade in a two-country world, where one of the countries is "small" in that it behaves as if it
has no influence on its terms of trade. As we saw earlier, a "small" open economy's optimal choice of its
labour standard depends on its factor endowment and terms of trade. By exercising its own trade
policy instrument, say tariffs or quotas, the large country can influence the terms of trade faced by the
small country and thereby affect its choice of labour standards. If the small country's labour standard
influences the welfare of the citizens of the large country (because of their humanitarian concerns),
then the terms-of-trade effect of its choice of tariffs has two effects on welfare of the large country.
The first is the usual direct welfare effect of changes in terms-of-trade and the second is the indirect
welfare effect arising from induced changes in small country's labour standard. To the extent a tariff
shifts the terms-of-trade in favour of the large country, the first effect is positive. But the second effect
could be negative since the adverse shift in terms of trade of the small country might induce a
reduction in its labour standard. Depending on the balance between the two effects, it is possible that
by choosing its welfare maximizing tariff, the large country could induce the small country to improve
its labour standards relative to free trade.10 But it could also deteriorate the standards if the balance

10

With spillover externalities, a laissez-faire free trade equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal.
However with a one-way spillover effect (i.e. labour standards of the small country affects the welfare
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between the two effects were different. The upshot is that if first-best policy instruments are
unavailable, trade policy instruments could, though not necessarily would, help in raising labour
standards in poor countries. However, welfare of such countries need not rise.

4.2. Rodrik (1996) and Krueger (1996) on Labour Standards
Rodrik (1996) draws an analytical distinction between two arguments, which he claims "are
often mixed-up" (p. 5), for the use of trade policy instruments for enforcing particular labour standards.
The first is "that trade is a channel through which labour standards are arbitraged across countries
towards the lowest level, requiring the use of trade policy to prevent a "race to the bottom" (p. 5). The
second is "that trade (and trade sanctions in particular) should be used to enforce internationally
agreed standards such as ILO conventions, or to simply get trade partners to improve their labour
standards" (p. 5). The distinction arises from the intended effect of trade policy. In the first case, the
primary intention is to prevent trade with poor countries eroding domestic labour standards, and not
so much to change the labour standards in the poor countries themselves. On the other hand, in the
second case, the primary goal is to enforce different, presumably higher, labour standards in poor
countries than those prevailing in them through the threat of denial of access to markets of developed
countries.
The first argument rests on the logic of competition among buyers and sellers of labour: no
buyer will be able to hire a worker at terms worse than the best among those she can get from other
buyers in the market and no worker can expect to sell his labour to a buyer at terms better than the
best among those offered by other workers to that buyer. If labour standards are private goods and, for
simplicity, the only component other than wages in terms of work for which there is competition, then,

of the large country and not vice versa, with the unilateral exercise of market power by the large
country, even though labour standards of the small country improves over its free trade value, welfare
of the small country need not.
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in a competitive equilibrium of a closed economy without any market failure of any kind, the wage
structure will reflect labour standards across industries. Thus, equilibrium differentials in wages will
compensate for any differences across sectors and occupations etc. in labour standards. Any 'moral' or
other considerations relating to labour standards that workers deem relevant and hence embody in
their preferences would be reflected fully in the equilibrium structure of standards. No mandatory
regulations would be required to enforce them.
Workers in an economy open to trade in goods but not in labour do not directly compete with
workers in other economies and, as such, the logic of competition among workers in a single market
does not apply directly. But as generations of students have been taught, trade in goods is a substitute
(and under appropriate situations, a perfect substitute) for trade and non-traded factors, including
labour, that are involved in the production of goods. Indeed, the ancient pauper labour argument was
in fact based on wage competition and the "race to the bottom" argument for the use of trade policy in
enforcing on labour standards is the same old pauper labour argument, now couched in terms of
competition in labour standards. But there is little empirical evidence for the actual use of labour
standards as a competitive tool. The available evidence summarized in OECD (1996) suggests the
core labour standards do not play a significant role in comparative costs and export performance. In
any case, the conventional answer to the pauper labour argument in the context of trade between rich
North and poor South, as Rodrik (1996) points out, is "While unskilled labor may lose, the North is
richer as a whole, and if governments in the North wished to do so they could compensate the losers
and still come out ahead" (p. 8).

25
Thus in the absence of market failures11 and any constraints on the ability of Northern
governments to compensate potential losers from competition in trade with the South, comparative
advantage, even if it reflects in part differences in prevailing labour standards, is legitimate and so are
gains from trade based on it. Thus, there is no case for trade restrictions. Clearly, if such advantage is
gained by flouting universal moral norms, it is obviously illegitimate. For example, any cost advantage
in products produced by prisoners could be universally deemed illegitimate. Indeed, it is for this
reason that GATT-WTO allows countries to place otherwise disallowed quantitative restrictions on
trade in such products. China has been accused of exporting such products.
If universal moral norms are indeed the foundations of the case against unfettered trade in
products made by prisoners, then what should one make of the activities of UNICOR, a corporation
wholly owned by the Federal Government of the U.S., run by the Bureau of Prisons in the United
States?12 It operates 100 factories, sells over 150 products including "prescription glasses, safety
eyewear, linens, monogrammed towels, executive office furniture, bedroom sets, gloves, brooms and
brushes of all kinds, even targets for target practice. They also make cables and electronic component
parts for Army tanks, jet fighters and the Patriot missile." Its gross sales in 1995 were around $500
million, of which wages paid to prisoners was about $35 million! According to Mr. Schwlab, Assistant
Director of Corporate Management of UNICOR, prisoners are "not covered by Fair Labor Standards

11

It is not very difficult to construct theoretical examples of failures in the labour market and of
the possibility of multiple equilibria, where the imposition of labour standards could alleviate the
market failure or move the economy to a Pareto superior equilibrium. But the issue is not one of
theory but of its wide empirical relevance. Establishing the existence of a significant externality
empirically in a convincing and econometrically sound fashion is more difficult and hence rare, than
assertions of such existence. Also, it is not enough to show that mandating of labour standards would
address the failure in labour markets. It has to be shown that there are no other more cost-effective
means of addressing such failures. If everything else fails, a resourceful economist can always think up
an uninternalized "externality" and the resultant market failure!
12

The description of the activities of UNICOR and the quotations in this paragraph are taken
from the transcript of the programme "60 Minutes" broadcast by CBS on October 20, 1996.
[Transcript prepared by Burrelle's Information Services, Box 7, Livingstone, N.J.]
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Act, minimum wage laws. They don't get retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, etc.
They're workers, but they're not employees." Besides publicly owned UNICOR, private industry has
been attracted and allowed to operate within prisons, and as the owner of one such private company
agreed, it was a fantastic deal all the way around and he liked "the financial advantages of a prison
business, namely, getting to hire the cream of the crop from a pool of cheap prison labor, not to
mention the use of ... brand new air-conditioned factory space, rent free." The cost advantage of
UNICOR and any private business operating with prison labour should be obvious. Yet, as the
narrator of the story put it, without realizing the absurdity of the economic reasoning involved,
"Back in 1934, when Congress created UNICOR, it restricted its sales to one and only
one customer, the federal government. The reason: to prevent UNICOR's cheap prison
labor from undercutting private industry in the commercial marketplace. But Congress
also armed UNICOR with one big advantage: It gets first crack at the government's
business, even at the expense of private companies competing for the same work."
Clearly, any sale to government by UNICOR displaces what another producer, domestic or
foreign, would have made! It is irrelevant that UNICOR is not allowed to export or sell to domestic
private sector. Yet those in the United States and the OECD, who accuse less developed countries
with lower labour standards than their own as engaging in social dumping, fail to see that the
operation of UNICOR has the same effect!
Instead of relying on universal norms to question the legitimacy of all trade in particular
products, Rodrik (1996) builds his case on the arguments that "Nations do have collective preferences
over what kinds of production technologies are admissible ("fair" or "legitimate") (p. 9) and "All
governments take into account consideration of fairness and legitimacy in their regulations governing
which technologies are admissible and with are not. The concern over labour standards is just another
manifestation of this principle" (Rodrik (1996), p. 32).13 He then appeals to the self-evident

13

Rodrik rationalizes collective preferences over technologies with the argument that
individuals "May have preferences not only over outcomes (their "consumption bundles") but over the
processes through which these outcomes are generated" (Rodrik (1996), p. 32). For example, an
individual may prefer a shirt produced by a worker above the age of 18 to that produced by one below
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proposition that having an opportunity to exchange what one produces with one's resources for what
one consumes through trade is equivalent to adding another technology to the domestic production
technology for transforming one's resources for final consumption. As such, "free trade with a lowstandard country would be no different than importing workers abroad and allowing them to work
under the same poor conditions" (p. 11). If a country proscribes "sweat shops" at home, it should be
allowed to reject free trade and importation of goods produced in "sweat shops" abroad.
Leaving aside the fact that there are numerous sweatshops in the U.S. itself and that the
Department of Labour has confessed its inability to finance even moderately adequate enforcement of
laws against their operation, Rodrik's argument does not carry weight if it is used to deny market
access to foreign goods manufactured with domestically "unacceptable" procedures. First, government
regulations operate not only with respect to labour standards, but also a whole host of other factors
that influence cost of production, such as, for example, building codes, zoning laws etc. The Rodrik
principle applied to these imply that, if a country prohibits certain types of structures (such as, for
example, buildings that exceed a specified height) or the use of certain types of building materials
within its territory, then free trade with, and importing the same product from, a country which does
not have such regulations is no different than producing the same product at home in a structure that
does not meet the regulations. Thus any and all regulations that affect the cost of production of any
product at home in principle, could induce home producers to call for restrictions on imports of the
same product. A moment's reflection is enough to convince oneself that this opens the door for

18. Whether such a preference should be viewed as arising from an altruistic concern over the welfare
of children below the age of 18 is arguable. Rodrik refers to Sen (1995) in this context. Sen's
discussion of processes or procedures critically examines the distinction between consequentialist and
deontological reasoning founded on procedural fairness. Whether procedural fairness is in effect
consequentialist because the fairness of a procedure "rests squarely on previous evaluation of its
consequences" (Dasgupta (1993), p. 31) or it is not, so that "pure procedural justice obtains when there
is no independent criterion for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the
procedure has been followed" (Rawls (1972), p. 86), it is hard to see how either view is of any
relevance to Rodrik's characterization of individual preferences.
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attempts to offset comparative advantage of foreign producers by depicting it as arising from
differences in regulations relative to those prevailing at home.14
The second argument for the use of trade sanctions to enforce particular labour standards of
advanced nations in poor countries is unpersuasive. As argued in Sections 2 and 3, first of all, in no
sense can one attribute universality and eternity to those standards. Second, even if humanitarian
concerns about the welfare of workers in poor countries were behind the desire to enforce higher
standards on them, more efficient instruments than trade sanctions are available to enforce them. In
any case, as Rodrik himself points out, in a related context, the reason why advanced nations do not
"condone a substantially lower set of working conditions for migrant workers (temporary or otherwise)
... have less to do with humanitarian concerns for foreigners than with ensuring labor standards for
domestic workers do not erode" (Rodrik (1996), p. 11). One is therefore led to conclude that
conventional protectionist pauper-labour type argument, rather than lofty humanitarianism, that is
behind the clamour for the use of trade policy instruments to enforce particular labour standards in
poor countries. As such, succumbing to the clamour would amount to using inefficient distortionary
trade restrictions, rather than non-distortionary domestic policies in rich countries, for redistributing
gains from trade, thereby imposing avoidable welfare losses on poor countries.
Krueger (1996) analyzes some political economy aspects of linkage between trade policies and
labour standards. He finds from his linear probability regressions that members of U.S. Congress

14

Distinguishing products by the processes by which they are produced can easily lead to the
imposition of trade restrictions that are prima facie non-discriminatory but de facto discriminatory. I
cannot resist quoting from Haberler's (1936, p. 339) classic work to illustrate this possibility:
"Another reason for the increasing complication of tariff schedules is the effort to evade the
Most Favoured National Clause. To this end, the specialisation of tariff items is sometimes carried so
far that a slight difference of quality, if it is found only in goods coming from a certain country or
countries, is listed as a separate item. In this way it is possible, if desired, to reduce the duty on goods
coming from one country without also reducing it--under the provisions of the Most Favoured Nation
Clause--upon similar goods from other countries. The example of this always quoted is a provision in
the German tariff, dating from 1902 and still valid, which is clearly meant to apply to Switzerland and
Austria, relating to "brown or dappled cows reared at a level of at least 300 metres above the sea and
passing at least one month in every summer at a height of at least 800 metres."
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representing districts with relatively many unskilled workers, who are most likely to compete with child
labour, are less likely to support a ban on imports made with child labour. He concludes from this
finding that lobbying in industrialized countries for linking market access of developing countries to
their observance of labour standards does not necessarily represent disguised protectionism. But, by
the same token, it is not necessarily a refutation of the claim that it does. First of all, if a
representative did not choose to cosponsor the Child Labour Deterrence Act of 1995, it does not imply
his or her lack of support for the legislation, although, to be fair, cosponsoring could be construed as
indicating stronger support. Second, since the proportion of eligible voters who actually vote differs
across population groups and the less educated and unskilled are less likely to vote, their interests
might weigh less heavily in the decision of the representative to cosponsor or not.15 Third, and most
important, even if one accepts Krueger's econometric analysis as valid, as Krueger himself notes, his
regressions suggest that those who support international labour standards are more likely to support
protectionist policies more generally and that representatives from districts that have a higher rate of
unionization are more likely to be cosponsors.16

15

Whether or not Krueger's econometric estimates are biased for these reasons depends on the
theoretical framework underlying the estimating equation. For example, consider a two-stage decision
making by a representative. At the first stage the representative decides whether he would vote for any
legislation that might come up mandating international labour standards. If he decides he would not
vote, there is no second stage. If he decides that he would vote, then there is a second stage decision
whether he would be proactive and cosponsor such legislation or not. Under some specifications of
explanatory variables and distribution of error terms for each decision, a bias could arise in the
estimates.
Also under certain circumstances even politicians who ignore worker's interests might still vote
for import restriction. For example, consider a specific factors model in which the capital in industries
competing with imports of products from countries with low labour standards is specific to those
industries and suppose a proportion (but not all) of the unskilled labour force is employed in those
industries as well. Intensification of import competition in these industries will affect the interests of
owners of specific factors adversely, while its effect on the welfare of unskilled labour is ambiguous.
Suppose it is adverse. Then even politicians who ignore interests of labour would support import
restriction in this case since it protects the interests capital specific to these industries.
16

It is argued by some that it is extremely unlikely that union members stand to gain from a
ban on imports of goods made with child labour because almost all union members do not compete
with child labour. However, there is a slippery-slope argument on the other side. If the unions did not
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A number of empirical studies on various aspects of competitiveness in world markets, flow of
foreign direct investment and labour standards are available. Serious data and econometric problems
plague many of them. Most are based on multiple regressions usually estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS). Few of the regressions estimated are derived from any well-specified theoretical
framework: the explanatory variables are often chosen based more on their plausibility than on theory.
Proxies used, as for example by Rodrik (1996), for labour standards obtaining in a country (e.g. total
number of ILO conventions ratified), statutory hours of work, etc.) are subject to significant
measurement errors. Not all explanatory variables can be deemed truly exogenous. For example,
whether to satisfy an ILO convention or not is a matter of choice. As is well known, if explanatory
variables are either subject to measurement errors or endogenous or both, the OLS estimates of
regression parameters will be inconsistent.
Stern (1996) and OECD (1996) summarize the results from many of the empirical studies.
The conclusions of OECD (1996) are worth excerpting:
On core labour standards and export performance:
"Within these limitations, empirical findings confirm the analytical results that core
labour standards do not play a significant role in shaping trade performance. The view
which argues that low-standards countries will enjoy gains in export market shares to
the detriment of high-standards countries appears to lack solid empirical
support...Moreover, the main result that emerges form a cross-country analysis of
comparative advantage is that patterns of specialisation are mainly governed by the
relative abundance of factors of production and technology differences...These findings
also imply that any fear on the part of developing countries that better core standards
would negatively affect either their economic performance or their competitive position
in world markets has no economic rationale." (p. 38)
On core labour standards and trade liberalization:
"The empirical results presented for the sample of 44 countries do not provide
unambiguous support for one pattern of sequencing over the other as to whether trade
liberalisation or freer association rights come first. Rather, the clearest and most

take a stand on one labour issue, viz. ban on imports of goods made with child labour, albeit one in
which their members may not have a direct interest, their credibility and clout could be weakened on
other issues in which their members have a direct interest.
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reliable finding is in favour of a mutually supportive relationship between successfully
sustained trade reforms and improvements in association and bargaining rights." (p.
43)
On core labour standards and FDI:
"Empirical evidence on the direct relationship between FDI and core labour standards
is scarce and remains open to different interpretations...According to reports by MNEs
from OECD countries, core labour standards are not considered a factor in assessing
investment opportunities in a potential host country." (p. 50)
On trade, employment and wages:
"Typically, analysts find that the impact of trade on employment and wage relativities has been
significant in specific sectors. They also find that the measurable negative impact arising
through increased import penetration is highest in sectors that employ relatively large numbers
of low-skilled workers. Almost all studies find that the impact of trade on employment is small
relative to changes in employment overall." (p. 51)
In sum, economic theory and empirical evidence confirm that the case for linking trade with
observance of core labour standards is far from persuasive.

5.

Multilateral Institutions and Labour Standards
The deceptively appealing notion that lower labour standards in a country relative to its

trading partners confer on it an unfair competitive advantage was already present in the charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO) negotiated by participant countries at Havana in 1948.
Charnovitz (1987: 566-67), in his historical review of labour standards in the world trading regime,
notes that Article 7 of the ITO stated that "The members recognize that unfair labor conditions,
particularly in the production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and accordingly, each
member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within
its territory." The ITO did not come into being primarily because the United States did not ratify its
charter. However, the General Agreement on Tariffs (GATT) consisting of tariff reductions and
general clauses consisting of a set of rules and obligations which had been negotiated earlier and
intended to operate under the umbrella of the ITO, came to be applied through its Protocol of
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Provisional Application. Except for allowing countries to prohibit trade in goods made with prison
labour, the articles of GATT did not deal with labour standards. Various administrations in the
United States (US), Democrat and Republican, have proposed the inclusion of a labour standards
article in the GATT, unsuccessfully as it turned out, during several rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations. Similar proposals have been made by political parties in national parliaments in several
European countries and also in the European Parliament.
The latest proposal is for the formal inclusion of a "social" clause in the mandate of the WTO
that would allow restrictions to be placed on imports of products originating in countries not
complying with a specified set of minimum standards. Such a proposal in itself is not a surprise except
in its timing, namely that it was raised after the painful and lengthy negotiations of the Uruguay Round
had been completed, almost holding the negotiated agreement hostage. The agreement was signed, but
not without an understanding that the topic of labour standards could be discussed by the preparatory
committee for the WTO. Of course, the facts that the demand has been raised repeatedly and an
understanding to discuss it has been arrived at do not necessarily make it legitimate. Indeed, as was
argued below in Section 3, if ethical considerations were the only factor behind this recent interest in
labour standards, there would be no reason for demanding a social clause.
The late Jan Tinbergen, Nobel Laureate in economics, pointed out that in general there must
be at least as many instruments of policy as there are objectives and that in achieving any objective
that policy instrument which has the most direct impact on that objective is most likely, though not
always, to do so at the least social cost. His principle applies as well to the creation of agencies that set
the rules governing international economic transactions and the specification of their mandates. Thus
the GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development were created as agencies
specializing in issues relating to international trade; the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund were designed to deal respectively with financing long-term development and short-term
stabilization. Universal Postal Union covered postal and other matters of international
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communication. Berne and Paris conventions addressed some aspects of intellectual property rights.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) deals with labour issues. Clearly such specialization
makes eminent sense. Loading one specialized agency with matters that fall within the purview of
another, such as including a social clause in the mandate of the WTO rather than leaving labour
standards within the purview of the ILO while ensuring consistency of actions of both through mutual
consultation where appropriate, is not conducive to addressing them efficiently. Yet, ostensibly
because of their presumed relatedness to trade, intellectual property rights and investment measures
were included in the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations and have become part of
the WTO. A committee on Trade and Environment has been constituted in the WTO as envisaged
under the UR agreement.
It is becoming clear that the issues of labour standards, environment and employment "will be
the big three issues, as will the integration of developing countries into the trading system" at the first
Ministerial Meeting in December 1996 of WTO (R. Ruggiero, Director-General of WTO, in an
interview, International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1996). Even though Australia, Japan and ASEAN
nations have already expressed their opposition to the discussion of issues which are not specifically
related to trade, such as corruption and social clauses, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr.
Warren Christopher, has gone on record at the July 1996 meeting of ASEAN that the relationship
between trade and labour standards would be one of Washington's priorities besides the issue of illicit
payments (i. e. corruption) at the Singapore meeting.
It is clear that the issue of labour standards will continue to be brought up in the WTO,
particularly by the US, as it was several times in the past in GATT. But the facts that support for
labour standards in developed countries rests in part on genuine moral grounds of the concern of their
citizens with the welfare of children in developing countries and that the belief that "unfair" labour
conditions, particularly in the production of export, create difficulties in international trade is long
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standing, do not mean that protectionism is not currently the driving force behind the demand for a
"social" clause in the charter of the WTO.
First of all, this demand is being pushed with great vigour by major developed countries at the
present time when imports from developing countries are penetrating their markets to an increasing
extent. Second, there is a curious asymmetry in the contents of the proposed clause: they focus almost
exclusively on those labour standards which are presumed to be "low" in developing countries and not
on those equally plausible ones which are absent in many, but not all, developed countries (Bhagwati
(1995)). The asymmetry would be unlikely, if the driving force behind the social clause was some
universal moral concern with labour standards. For example, along with the workers' right to unionize
and bargain collectively, one might also include the right to be represented in the management of
firms, if not a right to a share in the firm's profits. To take another example, it is argued that many
developing countries do not enforce their own laws such as those relating to compulsory schooling or to
labour standards. By the same token many developed countries do not enforce their own laws on drug
use as effectively as their resources would allow. Should the resources devoted to law enforcement,
given the resource and information constraints, and the difficult choices facing governments as to the
allocation of these resources among alternative targets, become matters for international negotiations?
Can developing countries tell the outgoing US Labour Secretary, Robert Reich, when he laments the
lack of funds to bring monitoring of sweatshops up to snuff, that the U.S. must find the resources or
face WTO suspension of market access for exports of goods that are produced in sweatshops?
The timing of the demand for and contents of the proposed clause as well as the concern only
with enforcement of a particular set of laws, viz. those relating to labour standards, all point to only
one conclusion: that protectionist interests have captured the drive for labour standards.17 It is

17

Robert Pahre, in his discussion, presented an example of a complete information game in
which, but for the support of protectionists, the threat of trade sanctions is not credible. With such
support and hence credibility of the threat, the country being threatened capitulates and improves its
human rights record without the threatening country having to impose the sanctions. While this
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extremely essential that developing countries together with Australia, Japan and other like-minded
industrialized countries take a firm stand at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting against the inclusion of
a discussion of labour standards in the agenda.18
Of course, excluding labour standards from the ambit of WTO does not mean the issue is
neither important nor relevant for international fora. There is already an international forum for
discussing it viz. the ILO. The main reason why the issue is being pushed in the WTO, rather than
the ILO, is that while the ILO has no enforcement mechanism for its conventions other than
persuasion and technical assistance, in the WTO there is the possibility of the use of trade sanctions as
a means of enforcement. Since trade measures are not necessarily the best instruments of enforcement,
a far better alternative than including a social clause in the WTO is to seek other ways of ensuring that
members of ILO comply with conventions on labour standards that they sign and ratify. Clearly, with
substantial overlap in the membership of the two organisations, even without a social clause in the
WTO, if such a future ILO compliance mechanism fails, the members of ILO in their dual capacity as
members of WTO as well, could decide to use trade measures if necessary.
Finally, there is the danger that if the issue of labour standards is not discussed in an
appropriate multilateral forum such as the ILO, it will be taken up in other contexts such as bilateral,
plurilateral and regional trade agreements.19 For example, as part of the price to get congressional

example highlights the role of credibility, the fact that credibility is achieved with the support of
protectionists is incidental and not essential. The essential point is that credibility, however achieved,
serves to ensure that the threatened country capitulates without sanctions having to be imposed.
18

It is extremely heartening to note that at the Singapore meeting, the ministers, in their draft
declaration, have wisely decided to "renew their commitment to core labour standards but say the
International Labour Organisation is the competent body to set these standards. They affirm support
for the ILO's work, reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes and say the
comparative advantage of low-wage countries 'must in no way be put in question'" (Financial Times,
December 13, 1996, p. 8).
19

I should also mention here some unilateral actions. GATT allows developed countries to
offer preferential access to their markets to developing countries under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). The US and EU have conditioned the grant of such preferences to the observance
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approval in the US of the North American Free Trade agreement, Mexico and Canada had to agree to
a side agreement on labour and environmental standards. Since the start of the Uruguay Round, there
was a disturbing and unfortunate increase in the number of discriminatory regional trade agreements
concluded, as well as proposed. Contrary to the expectation of some, the successful conclusion of the
Round did not stop this trend--on the contrary, there is some evidence of acceleration. Many
developing countries are already members or eager to become members of such agreements. This
eagerness might lead them to accept side agreements on labour standards that are not necessarily in
their interest.

by developing countries of particular labour standards that the US and EU deem important. I should
add, however, that whether or not its grant is conditional, GSP is the analogue of "crumbs from the
rich man's table" which the developing countries should do well without.
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